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Abstract 
Many African countries have moved into the production of non-traditional agricultural products to diversify their 
exports and increase foreign currency earnings. Accessing developed country markets requires meeting food 
safety standards brought about by several demand and supply side factors. Food retailers in the EU, the major 
destination market, have developed protocols relating to pesticide residue limits, field and packinghouse hygiene, 
and traceability. In this changing scenario where food safety requirements are getting increasingly stringent, there 
are worries that companies that establish production centers in LDCs might exclude smallholder farmers. In this 
paper, we study the cases of green beans production in Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia for export to high value 
European markets. Though the immediate effect of the imposition of stringent food safety standards has been to 
screen away smallholders, there has been continued participation of smallholders in some cases. This paper finds 
that emergence of new institutional arrangements have enabled the smallholders to maintain their participation in 
high value European markets. In particular, public-private partnerships have played a key role in helping 
smallholder farmers acquire training on and certification against European food safety standards. Collective 
action in form of producer organizations has enabled smallholders to jointly invest in costly facilities and take 
advantage of economies of scale to remain competitive. Producer organizations also allow for cheaper means for 
buyers to ensure traceability and are critical in reducing transaction costs of linking up with smallholders.  
Key words: international food safety standards, compliance, smallholder farmers, institutional arrangements, 
collective action, producer organizations, public-private partnerships. 
 
Introduction 
In the past few decades there have been substantial 
changes in how agricultural products are produced, 
processed, consumed, and marketed. Many countries 
in Africa, like other developing countries, have gone 
into the production of non-traditional agriculture 
products to diversify their agricultural exports and 
increase foreign exchange earnings (Singh, 2002). 
South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco and 
Kenya are among the leading non-traditional crop 
exporters to the European Union (EU) with green bean 
as the leading export.   
Concurrent with the increase in exports in African 
countries, there has been a heightened attention on 
food safety in the EU (as in other developed and 
developing countries) (Unnevehr, 2003). This has 
resulted from several factors viz. increase in incomes, 
improvements in technology in measuring 
contaminants and equally importantly the incidences 
of several   international food scares, including those 
related to Salmonella and Listeria in fruits and 
vegetables as well as BSE and avian flu.   
The high labor endowments in Africa have attracted 
national and multinational companies to begin 
sourcing their supplies of fresh produce from there. 
These companies have developed stringent food safety 
protocols relating to pesticide residue limits, packer 
hygiene and traceability (Friedberg, 2004). To comply 
with these international food safety standards (IFSS) 
requires switching to safer but costlier pesticides, 
investment in costly medium and long-term assets 
(grading/packing and cooling facilities) and keeping 
technical records of pesticide usage and application. 
Owing to such requirements, majority of poor small 
farmers not necessarily aligned to these companies 
(Dolan and Humphrey, 2000).   
With regard to meeting food safety standards, the 
small farmers face several difficulties viz.( In both 
Kenya and Ethiopia, we define smallholder farmer as 
one with 0-2 acres of green beans and medium scale, Institutional Innovations for Smallholder Farmers 
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between 2 acres and 10 acres and large scale, more 
than 10 acres under beans. ) 1) how to produce safe 
food, 2) how to be recognized as producing safe food, 
3) how to be competitive with larger producers with 
economies of scale in compliance with food safety 
requirements and, 4) how to identify cost-effective 
technologies for reducing risk. While there is 
empirical evidence that IFSS has screened out many 
small farmers, cases exist where farmers have worked 
around them and increased participation in HVC 
(Okello, 2005; Minten, 2005); one such case relating 
to green beans in three African countries is the focus 
of this paper. This paper specifically examines the 
institutional arrangements that have emerged to keep 
small farmers in the fresh green bean HVC. It focuses 
on green bean production in Kenya, Zambia and 
Ethiopia for export to EU markets. Green beans are 
among the most important fresh vegetables exported 
from developing countries. Also, green bean 
production has been predominantly in the hands of 
small farmers in Africa. 
Among the three countries studied there are important 
variations with regard to the impact of IFSS. Part of 
the difference is attributable to their time of entry in 
the export markets with Kenya having a long history in 
these export markets while Zambia and Ethiopia are 
fairly new to this market. Further, Kenya started 
exporting to EU and developing the infrastructure and 
institutions (involving smallholders) before the IFSS 
were in place while Zambia and Ethiopia entered with 
the IFSS system already set in. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the conceptual 
framework. Section 3 discusses the institutional 
response to IFSS especially in relation to the 
participation of the smallholders. Section 4 concludes.  
Conceptual and empirical methods 
This paper uses the transaction cost theory to examine 
response to IFSS by African green bean exporting 
countries. The emergence of IFSS has resulted in 
development of networks of relationships aimed at 
coordinating procurement of beans from developing 
country sources. The development of close 
relationships can result in transaction dependency and 
opportunism, especially where the transaction needs 
specific assets or is characterized by uncertainty. The 
literature identifies four types of asset specificity 
namely; temporal, physical, human, and locational (see 
Okello, 2005 for details). Asset specificity can lead to 
market failures following ex-post opportunism from 
the party not investing in such assets. Where assets are 
lumpy , the smallholders are going to be disadvantaged 
because of diseconomies of scale (Poulton et al, 2005). 
The disadvantage of the smallholders is aggravated 
because of poor public infrastructure that aggravates 
the need for private provision (like unreliable 
electricity leading to need for private generators). 
Geographical dispersion of farmers can further drive 
up costs of enforcing buyer requirements hence screen 
out some farmers.  
Theoretically, a number of institutional mechanisms 
for integrating smallholder farmers into the HVC exist. 
First, smallholder farmers could orient their product to 
target markets that are less demanding by shifting 
from the demanding supermarket chain to the less 
stringent wholesale chain and domestic markets. 
Second, smallholders can, through collective action, 
invest jointly in lumpy/costly assets together hence 
take advantage of economies of scale and reduce per 
farmer costs of such investment. Third, public sector 
could partner with the private sector to help 
smallholders overcome the challenges of market 
requirements by investing on infrastructural 
requirements that are lumpy or have public good 
characteristics (training and extension, road, supply of 
safe water).   
The research in this paper entailed interviews with 
various participants in the green bean HVC conducted 
between January and February 2006 in Zambia, Kenya 
and Ethiopia. The interviewees included smallholder 
farmers, farmer group leaders, horticultural industry 
association leaders, exporters, domestic green bean 
buyers, EU importers and EU supermarkets and 
certification companies. The interviews were 
supplemented with secondary information and data 
from household survey conducted in 2004 by the lead 
author (see Okello, 2005). 
Effect of IFSS on Smallholders and Institutional 
Innovations for their Compliance 
IFSS lead to more tightly coordinated supply chains. A 
tightly coordinated HVC works against the 
smallholders due to i) increased information 
asymmetry and transaction costs, ii) organizational 
constraints, and iii) regulatory failure (Rich and 
Narrod, 2005).  The impact of IFSS on smallholders is 
evident from the following summary statistics.  
While over 60% of green beans were produced by 
smallholders in Kenya in 1980s, their share had Okello, J.J. et al. 
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dropped to about 30% by 2003 (Jaffee, 2003, 
Kimenye, 1993). In Zambia, an estimated 500 
smallholder outgrowers producing beans on a year 
round for export exited when they could not find a 
market following the collapse of their buyers in 2004 
over financial problems unrelated to compliance with 
IFSS (Okello, et al, forthcoming). Other exporters 
refused to buy smallholders’ beans for fear that they 
could violate pesticide residue and hygiene standards.   
In Ethiopia, expansion of small farmer participation is 
curtailed by the difficulties such farmers face in 
meeting the requirements.   
With this screening effect, the institutional 
mechanisms that have helped some smallholders meet 
the IFSS are: re-orientation of the target market or 
product, contract farming by the exporters with farmer 
groups and formation of alliances among NGOs, 
donors, and the public sector. We discuss these 
innovations in turn below. 
Switch in target market/product  
One of the strategies used by Kenya has been to switch 
from export to domestic canning industry. In 2000, 
only a few hundred farmers grew beans for the 
canning industry.  By 2004, thousands of smallholder 
farmers were growing beans for one of Kenya’s 
leading green bean canner, with 3,000 having attained 
EurepGAP certification (Okello, et al, forthcoming). In 
canning, the processing companies employ spray 
operators of pesticides for their outgrowers and do not 
allow farmers to handle the produce beyond harvesting 
and drop off at company designated collection points. 
Hence, farmers are not required to invest in the long 
term facilities (pesticide storage unit, shower room, 
toilet in the farm, grading shed) as in the beans for 
fresh export market. However, the price paid is up to 
25% lower.  
The second market orientation strategy adopted by the 
study countries, especially Ethiopia, has been the 
switch in products. Recently, in Ethiopia, there has 
been an expansion in flower production that has 
benefited smallholders exiting the green beans sector. 
Investment in flower production has in the last few 
years attracted a lot of donor and government support 
(Greenhalgh, 2005). The expanding flower industry 
has absorbed some smallholders (mainly as laborers) 
that could not cope with the increasingly demanding  
requirements of the fresh green bean export markets 
Contract production and collective action among 
green bean growers 
Contract farming helps poor smallholders by 
facilitating their access to inputs, in particular credit 
and technical information on pesticide usage, hygiene 
requirements and agronomic practices required under 
IFSS.  For buyers, contract production enables them to 
monitor and enforce IFSS compliance (at lower 
transaction costs) under longer term relationships. 
Small farmers in the three countries are linked with 
export markets through contracts with exporters. 
Kenya and Ethiopia in particular have active 
smallholder outgrower groups/cooperatives. 
Smallholders in such producer organizations (POs) 
received technical information essential for meeting 
pesticide usage and hygiene requirements of IFSS 
from the exporter as well as seeds as loan. In Kenya, 
the POs are organized as self help groups while in 
Zambia and Ethiopia they are organized as 
cooperatives.  
Leading exporters prefer working with POs because it 
is cheaper to train and monitor farmers as a group. POs 
also hire their own technical assistants who respond to 
members’ hygiene, pest and disease problems readily 
and enforce IFSS compliance. They also construct 
grading sheds charcoal coolers; and facilities for 
washing hands for members and in Kenya have 
established traceability systems. While most exporters 
monitor PO leaders, the POs also have a system of 
monitoring members (Okello, et al, forthcoming) 
Table 1 compares the typical costs of compliance with 
IFSS for a farmer group in Kenya, individual 
smallholder farmer and a large scale farmer producing 
beans under contract for exports to UK.  The cases 
were carefully selected to represent each category and 
data obtained from the records and supplemented by 
discussions with farmers, group leaders and one of the 
certification companies in Kenya. In all the cases, only 
one pre-audit is undertaken prior to certification. The 
smallholder farmer group has 15 members. The 
computation assumes that the small farmer’s plot is 
close to the homestead hence there is no need for a 
separate toilet and pesticide disposal pit/incinerator. 
Many exporters allow use of family toilet for 
disposing leftover pesticide and use by farm workers.  
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Source: Authors’ compilation.  
The key message from table 1 is that when the 
smallholders work together as a group the cost per unit 
of income is significantly lower. Hence, smallholders 
who belong to a farmer group face lower threat of 
being marginalized by the IFSS. The substantial 
increase in incomes earned in year two is potentially 
because the farmers i) increased their production and 
volume of sales once they got EurepGAP certification 
(which allowed them more reliable access to export 
market), and ii) learned how to cope with standards 
(Henson, et al, 2005).  
Public-Private partnerships (PPP) 
The first role of partnerships with public sector 
emanates in the formation of producer organization 
itself. In the three countries, groups are formed by 
farmers (with common interest, need and/or goals) 
mobilizing themselves, electing temporary officials 
and then registering with relevant authority. Formation 
of producer organization, however, entails ex ante 
transaction costs related to search and screening of 
members. Negotiations/haggling over the size, 
membership fee, leadership, mode of punishment and 
sharing of benefits entail further costs. Therefore, 
formation of some smallholder organizations, 
especially in Ethiopia and Zambia, has been facilitated  
 
by the governments, exporters, non governmental 
organizations and donors. 
PPPs have mainly focused on provision of 
information, financial support, and capacity building 
(through financing audits and certification for 
EurepGAP compliance all the case countries and 
construction of grading facilities in Zambia and 
Ethiopia) to smallholders. Donors and NGO have also 
jointly established Africa’s only indigenous 
certification company aimed at making EurepGAP 
certification cheaper and hence accessible to 
smallholders. PPPs have also been instrumental in 
lobbying for the recognition of the ability of 
smallholders to meet EurepGAP standards and the 
adaptation of EurepGAP to local circumstances. 
Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The rising demand for green beans and the resulting 
better prices has lured more developing countries to 
enter the green bean production for high value 
markets. However, these high value markets are 
characterized by stringent food safety standards which 
have been tightened over time. The impact of the 
imposition of IFSS on small farmers has tended to be 
towards marginalization of the smallholders.   
Table 1: Costs and incomes (in Kenya Shillings) associated with IFSS compliance and     certification by 
grower type, 2006 
Cost item  Farmer group  Small 
farmer 
Large farmer  
Grading shed  59,800  20,000  34,000 
Charcoal cooler  41,000  5,400  32,000 
Toilet 5,000  -  7,000 
Pesticide storage unit 24,450  8,000  37,000 
Disposal pit   1,000  -  1,000 
Needs assessment & QA manuals  24,750  21,500  31,000 
Analyses (soil, water, MRL) 45,064  40,000  41,800 
Pre-audits 1  132,000  56,750  32,000 
Certification 105,890 94,540  94,540 
Total IFSS  investment costs 438,954  228,190  311,340 
Cost per farmer  29,264  228,190  311,340 
Year 1 income   3,600,000  96,000  384,000 
Year 2 income   7,520,000  240,000  864,000 
Total  income over investment period  11,120,000  336000  1,248,000 
“Cost of compliance” as % of total income    4  68  24 
The Exchange rate during time of survey was 1US$ = 74 Kenya Shillings Okello, J.J. et al. 
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However, through target market orientation, 
contracting and collective action (CA) in the form of 
POs, and PPPs, smallholders in some cases have been 
able to resolve some of the constraints such as access 
to technical advice, insurance and credit and attain 
EurepGAP certification. They have achieved this by 
focusing on less demanding markets, jointly investing 
in the facilities needed to meet the IFSS, and through 
support from private and public sectors. To what 
extent these initiatives are sustainable or can be scaled 
up remains to be researched. Given the scale 
economies and the requirements of traceability, CA 
among small farmers has been necessary. However, it 
truly has not been sufficient without supplementation 
with several PPPs Though we study the case of green 
beans, the analysis general and can be applied to a 
number of HVA export commodities being produced 
by the smallholders. Government and donor initiatives 
to enable smallholders access such markets raises 
important policy questions due the subsidies they 
involve. These subsidies apart from the fiscal cost also 
distort private incentives to invest in meeting the 
standards. Assessing the full costs and benefits of such 
institutions is an important area for further research. 
One generalizable feature of the interventions here is 
that at least in the short run, the role of government or 
the PPPs is crucial in helping the small farmers 
graduate to the stringent requirements of high value 
export markets.  
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